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ABSTRACT

This paper offers an econometric analysis of the problems of repayment of
external debt of developing countries along credit rationing lines, using a

panel set of data of 79 nations observed through 1970 to 1982.

The main model

presented employs hitherto unexploited sources of information about the
incidence and extent of credit constraints.

The estimation techniques pay

particular attention to the panel nature of the data, by allowing for random
effects to model unobserved country heterogeneity.

The problem of initial

conditions in non-linear dynamic models in panels is examined.

Several

hypotheses in the international finance literature ai-e formulated and tested
using the main model of this paper, including the role the "petrodollars"
played following the 1973 oil-shock, and the "liquidity versus solvency"
question.

A major empirical finding is that time dependence seems to arise

both thro1.1gh persistent country specific unobservable characteristics, and
through information theoretic conditions that make important the history of
debt repayments problems of a country.

Vassilis Argyrou Hajivassiliou, "Analyzing the Determinants of the External
Debt Repayments Problems of LDC's:
Set of Data"

Econometric Modelling Using a Panel
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.Analysing the Determin ants

of the Externa l Debt Repayments Problems of LDC's:
Estimati ons Using a Panel Set of Data4
V.A. Hajivas siliou
August 1985
Part I
Introduc tion
This paper, using as a starting point our recent work with others

([23], [15]), attempts to analyze and model the determin ants of'
repayme nt problems of' the developi ng countrie s.

For a general review

The basic thread in our analysis here is

of the 1iteratu re see [23).

the claim that the specific cost charged to a country by the
· internat ional bankers (in the form of a "spread" over the London
interban k offer rate (LIBOR)) does not perform the key role of clearing
the market for internat ional loans.

Instead the allocati on of scarce

credit among third world countrie s is fundame ntally carried out through
quantity offers and requests .

The interest rate cannot function as a

pure price in this context for at least two reasons:

First, as is well

known from the credit rationin g literatu re ([27]), moral hazard and
other informa tion theoreti c issues become very importan t in the absence
of' complete informa tion about the creditwo rthiness of the borrowe rs,
prospec tive or otherwis e.

Second, the probabi lity of default of a

borrower is affected by changes in the interest rate charged.

Hence it

might be rational for the agents to decide to let bargaini ng over
levels of lending perform the main allocati ve role in this market, at a
more or less exogenous price that is primaril y determin ed by the LIB0R
plus some "token" spread over that.

Recent empiric al evidence

([s])

*I would like to thank Stanley Fischer, Jerry Hausman and Daniel
McFadden for very helpful comments. Financia l support by the A.P.
Sloan Foundati on in the form of Doctora l Disserta tion Fellows hip #DD-2O
is gratefu lly acknowledged. The author retains full respons ibility for
any errors and shortcom ings.
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confirms the notion that the spreads perform only a minor role in the
allocation of international credit, since they do not seem to respond
very significantly to usual creditworthines s indicators.

Given that

all our modelling will fundamentally be based on the premise that the
spread does not endogenously perform any significant allocative
function, it becomes imperative that we formally test this exogeneity
assumption.

[13] derives appropriate asymptotic tests in the context of

disequilibrium econoaetric models.
We leave theoretical justification of this claimed exogeneity of
the spread to future research;

here we only note that recent game

theoretic work on the bargaining problem wit:h a "shrinking pie" as time
goes by (see [3] and [26] for results and references) yields the
implication that the eventual division will tend to favour the short
side of the lll$.rket, potentially very strongly so.

We view this as

providing a basic motivation for our modelling of lending transactions
as the realizations of various versions of the "short-side" rule of the
standard disequilibrium literature. 1
Section I of Part II aets up the basic framework of modelling and
discusses further the motivation for such an approach. -Three classes
of models are estimated and compared:

The first formulation (Model A),

which is analogous to the analysis in [6] and [7], proceeds with the
standard mimimUIII. side rule of the disequilibrium literature, without
any prejudgement as to whether in a particular period of observation
a country in question could or could not satisfy its demand for
international credit that her optimization planning model would ideally
dictate.

The second formulation (Model B), attempts to exploit

potentially valuable information (neglected in [6] and [7]) about the
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binding nature of credit constraints that is contained in the incidence
of repayments problems, as manifested by requests (explicit or
otherwise) of reschedulings of debt obligations, the existence of
arrears in these obligations, and of requests for International
Monetary Fund (IMF) assistance and/or involvement.

The third modelling

approach (the first versions of which appear in [23] and [15]) further
considers the extra

inforlliation that can be gleaned from the level of

arrears on the outstanding debt service obligations of the country in
question.

We present and estimate a model along these lines.

The

latter two approaches offer potentially significant advantages over
past treatments of the subject, that neglected these extra sources of
information.
Section II of Part II discusses another important innovation of
our paper which is the specific recognition of the panel nature of the ·
set of data used in the empirical implementation of the models.
To the best of our knowledge all previous analyses of disequilibrium
models :us;i.ng :PS:Ael data (including

[7])

possibility 0£ country heterogeneity.

have neglected the strong
A priori, countries appear to be

heterogeneous along many dimensions that are never modelled explicitly.
For example, LDC's differ significantly in terms of colonial history,
and political and financial institutions.

As

a result the assumption

of i.i.d. errors, necessary for the validity of econometric inferences
drawn from such studies, becomes untenable. 2

In this paper, in

contrast to past econometric practice, we introduce explicitly an
error-components structure in the unobservables, with country-specific
unobserved effects that persist over time.

In the Appendix, we
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describe the incorporation of unobservable country-specific random
effects as well as general year-specific fixed effects into the three
regime level-of-arrears model mentioned above. 3
The actual specification of the models to be estimated and the
hypotheses to be tested in this paper are discussed in Part III.
Part IV presents and analyzes the empirical implementation of these
models.

We first examine whether factors suggested in the literature

as detertnining country-creditworthiness indeed appear important.

We

then use our models to examine an ongoing controversy in the context of
international lending termed the "liquidity versus solvency" debate.
According to the fi.rst view, the international capital markets are not
frictionless, hence a debt crisis might be induced by a lack of
liquidity to a financially sound borrower.

The "solvency" view

maintains that the markets will never refuse access to a solvent
borrower, hence credit crises are manifestations of insolvency.
Another hypothesis tested concerns the role the "petrodollars" played
in the debt problems of the LDC's after the oil-shock of 1973.

The

view to be investigated is that the current debt problems in

international capital markets have been caused to a large extent by
"too easy" availability of credit following the influx of
"petrodollars" in search of a borrower, that took place after the 1973
events.

We further examine the role of the past debt history of a

country in affecting its creditworthiness-standing, as well as the
importance of country-specific unobservable effects.

Part V presents

within-sample "predictions" from the 3-regime model C for a subsample
of six La.tin American countries.

We close with a summary of the

empirical findings and suggestions for future research.
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Part II
We start from the basic quantity rationin g formulat ion of the
repaynie nts models and discuss the motivati on for such modellin g and for
the extensio ns attempte d in this paper.
Section I:

Theoret ical-Issu es

One of the problems that one encounte rs directly in modellin g
internat ional debt behavior is that credit transact ions are
non-unif orm across countrie s and lenders.
implica tions.

This has a number of

First, these specific charact eristics of credit markets

suggest a prevalen ce of quantity rather than price rationin g in the
equilibr ation process, since the price performs many roles on top of
its usual market- clearing one: a. it affects the distribu tion of income
between the lending and the borrowin g country, b. it performs a
signalli ng function , and c. it affects the probabi lity of defaulti ng on
a loan.

Hence the "spread" may not be relied upon to perform the

primary market- clearing function , quantity -rationi ng being used
instead.

This is the basic motivati on for the disequil ibrium approach

we took in (23] and (15] and which we extend below.
It is interest ing to note that a number of other studies, (notably
[6], [7]), have basicall y proceede d along disequil ibrium lines.

The EG

papers apply the standard switchin g regime apparatu s, allowing for the
separate identifi cation of supply and demand paramet ers.

We initiall y

adopt this approach on a greatly expanded sample of 79 countrie s
observed through the 1970-1982 period, whereas EG only had 45 countrie s
observed for the two years of 1970 and 1974°
While providin g importan t theoreti cal justific ation for an
approach that emphasiz es non-pric e rationin g, the EG techniqu e does not
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refine the empirical modeling of repayments problems.

For example, it

neglects the fact that the observation of a rescheduling provides
information on the classification of countries as supply constrained or
demand constrained.

As is well known in the disequilibrium literature,

the value of observations on regime classification can be quite high,
in terms of the performance of the estimation techniques used (see

[9]).

Therefore we proceed with models that use the actual incidence

of repayinents problems to classify regimes into constrained and
unconstrained periods. 4
A further extra source of' inforI11Ation hitherto neglected is data
on arrears which can be valuable in assessing the severity of a lending
constraint.

Hence we employ such extra information and refine the

regime-classification in.to a three-regime one.

The first regime is

characterized by a. total $.bsence of credit ra'!;iQX1ing, as the "notional" ·
demand for new loans by a countcy falls short of the max:i.mal supply of
loans by bankers, in which case the actual new loans just meet this
demand.

The intermediate regime is defined by a '!moderate" level of

excess 4eniand for new loans on the part of the country, a situation in
which the country will have to make do with the maximal new loans the
bankers are willing to supply and try to fill the gap by drawing up
"involuntary" loans in the form of allowing its debt obligations to go
into arrears.

However a rescheduling or other IMF conditionality

related programs are not yet necessary, as the required arrears are
deemed "acceptable" by the bankers in the sense of not exceeding a
specific limit.

Finally the third regime is defined by an IMF support

program and/or a rescheduling, as the arrears limit becomes binding.
This 3-regime model may be obtained as a special case of a formal model
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of optimization in the face of credit constraints, analyzed in [15],
which we now sketch.
an Appendix):

(The econometric implementation is described in

Consider a situation where a country faces the

possibility of credit constraints in the International Capital market.
The planners of this country solve the dynamic program of maximizing an
intertemporally separable welfare function, subject to the yossibility
of facing borrowing constraints in the future.

At the beginning of the

period the planners do not yet know whether they will be facing a
binding constraint or not in the period in question.

As a general

notation, denote by CA, Rand A the current account deficit, stock of
reserves and of arrears respectively.

Flow variables are flows during

the period, while stocks are at the end-of-period.
to this dynamic program would yield targets

CA,

The full solution

Rand

Aas

functions of

the credit constraint N3, which is treated ex-0genous to the borrower:

c1=c1( ••• ;&)
(II.1)

it =R (••• ; ~)

We assume that this full solution can be well approximated by the
following sequential procedure that actually elucidates the workings of
such a market:
Denote by CA*, RI' and A* the levels of Current Account deficit,
international Reserves and Arrears that solve the optimization problem
with the possibility of binding constraints in the future recognized,
but under the assumption of no credit co~raints in the current period,
i.e.

CA*=CA( ••• ;N3==).

is given in [25]).

(The formal characterization of this problem

Negotiations are then entered with

bankers concerning the amount of new lending to be eventually agreed
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The Current Account identity

upon.

(II.2)
implies a demand for new borrowing .6:D*.

In general A* will be Oas

arrears are more costly than direct borrowing.

The bankers then offer

a maximal level of new lending they are willing to supply denoted by
We assume that the bargaining process will result in the short

l!S.

side getting its way (see[;] and [26]).

In cases when the current

credit constra.int is binding for the country ( .6:D*>.65), the
administrators are left with a set of irreconcilable targets CA*, R"I"
and A*.

(It

is

irrelevant for our purposes how the bankers would

reallocate their portfolio in case the count:ey takes only part of the
The lenders are, perhaps unsatisfactorily so, reduced

offered credit.

to merely chooosing ~rationally).

We

therefore postulate a quadratic

loss function in the deviations of the levels CA*, R"I" and A* from their
chosen values

CA,

Rand

A,

to be minimized by the borrower subject to

the identity~constraint:
(II.;)
Formally the problem is:
z'Wz

min

(II.4) CA,R,A
subject to
(II.5)
where
z '= {( CA*-CA), (R*-R), (A-A*) },

(II.6)
i'=(1,1,1)

and Wis a positive definite matrix.

Note that the constraint can be
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simplified to

Note further that the administrators know exactly their targets R*, A*
and CA* obtained under the assumption of no constraints being currently
binding.

Hence the solution to this constrained loss-minimization

problem will be linear in CA*, RII- and A*, and will take the form:
(II-7)

(CA,R,A)'= M•(CA*,R*,A*,t.S)',

where Mis a 3x4 matrix. 5
In a more general setup one can imagine that constraints on

and

CA, i

A exist as well: for example bankers may forbid the stock of

arrears ever from rising above some limit A while political feasibility
issues might impose similar limits on Rand CA.

These further

constraints would be added along constraint (II.5) in the specification
of the two-step problem.

-

In case~ CA, Rand A could be found to

satisfy all four constraints, a real repayments pre>blem situation would
arise that would dictate drastic steps like requesting a rescheduling,
defaulting on the debt obligations and/or asking for an IMF agreement
with or without conditionality imposed.
We leave implementation of the full model with simultaneous
determination of all 3 ta~gets CA, Rand A to future research.

Here we

examine the assumptions required to obtain the 3-regime specification
of the main model we estimate below:

with A*=O, Regime 1 is defined b y ~

binding credit-constraints in period t, as~<

~s.

Alternatively

suppose that the credit constraint is binding (M)'ll->65).

Now assume

that the weights in the loss function Ware such that always CA*=CA and
R*=R, i.e., it is deemed extremely costly (for political purposes or
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otherwise) to deviate ever so slightly from these two targets.

~=&i

in

Since

such case, from constraint (II.3) we obtain

provided A is considered an acceptable level of arrears by bankers;
this defines the second regime of moderate excess demand.

Lastly when

A is unacceptable to bankers, a real repa2ents problem faces the
country, a situation that defines the third regime.

It is important to

note that in this "crisis" case the only information we use is that
arrears desired by a country in order to fill up its excess demand gap
exceed the level acceptable to bankers (see the Appendix).

Nothing is

said about actual transactions in such a case (e.g. new loans agreed
upon and ..level of arrears maintained).

We view negotiations on such

issues, which will inv-olve.third-parties like the IMF, as falling outside
the scope of analysis of this paper.
As can also be seen from the Appendix, our 3-regillle model is a
highly non-linear econometric model, containing characteristics from
all of the usual four classes of limited dependent variables in
econometrics:

the model simultaneously exhibits a. a probit structure,

since an indicator variable identifies the first regime of no debt
repayments problems from the repayments problems regimes 2 and 3; b. a
tobit structure, in that the observed level of arrears can be either 0
or positive; c. a switching regressions aspect, as the new flow of
lending to a country (AD) can be either equal t o ~ in regime 1 or to
!JS in regime 2; and finally d. an endogenously missing data structure

since, when regime 3 is observed we do not attempt to identify the level of
arrears and the new funds flowing to this economy.
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Section II:

Country Heterogeneity

The idiosyncracies involved with credit determination in
international markets discussed above have another important
i~lication that provides a basic motivation for this paper.

An

issue

neglected in all previous work on LDC debt performance has been the
temporal structure of unobservable variables, the implicit assumption
being tliat country-year shocks are all independently and identically-

,

dbtributed.

This can be a source of seri.ous misspecification, given

the panel nature· of most of these studies. · (An exception is [23] which
allows for cotintry...specific unobserved effects with a gene:ralized

probit estimation technique).

Temporal dependence can arise in at

least two ways in panel data.

First, individual (country) specific

unobservable characteristics can give rise to serial correlation.

Such

heterogeneity would seem to be an inevitable result of modelling debt
performance as a function of a small number of macroeconomic variables.
More importantly, as al~eady mentioned in the introduction,
unobservable persistent country heterogeneity appears a priori
important, since countries clearly differ in terms of coJ,.onial history,
and political, reiigious and financial institutions.

All of these

factors may affect a country's attitude towards borrowing in general
and defaulting on debt obligations, as well as the bankers' attitudes
towards the borrowing country in question.

Secondly, serial

correlation may be induced by state dependence that arises from
learning processes of the type stressed in the theoretical literature on
credit markets, by the fact

that history may be a good predict.or of

future debt repayments problems; by the role asset accumulation pl~ys
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in the problem; or by our failure to address questions about the
duration (actual or anticipated) of debt crises.
A simple form of heterogeneity can be incorporated in our models
by allowing the disturbance terms to have an error-components

structure:
(II.8)

where v.t is an i.i.d. normal random variable and n.1 is a country1

specific noi'mal randOJ11 variable, uncorrelated with vi t.

Using maxuum

likelihood techniques, the relative importance of the country effect n
can be assessed by comparing the estimated variance of n with the
estimated variance of v.

Such "one-factor" probit reduced form models

were estimated in [23] where the dummy dependent variable was
indicating the incidence of repayments problems, with the inclusion of
a lagged dependent variable (capturing the incidence of past such
problems).

Likelihoocl ratio tests suggested the presence of strong

state dependence, with a relatively weaker, but statistically quite
significant, effect of heterogeneity.

In our estimations below, we

introduce for the first time in disequilibrium models country..specific
unobservables.

The Appendix derives the correct likelihood expressions

under such error-components structures, for the three modelling
approaches.

Note that the estimation of the heterogeneity-model in

[23] did not make specific allowance for the presence of the lagged
dependent variable among the explanatory variables.

As

explained in

the Appendix below, this amounts to treating the initial values of the
dependent variable as exogenous, a procedure that causes inconsistency
in the parameter estimates.

- 13 -

Part III
Specification of Demand and Supply
The following issues motivate our empirical implementation of the
models we adopt:

First, we start from factors already identified in

the literature as determining the creditworthiness of a country and, as
a result, the supply of lending.

We therefore examine the ratio of

debt outstanding to exports as providing a measure of the extent to
which exports, the main source of foreign exchange, can cover the

external indebtedness of the country.

This ratio has been singled out

as an important indicator of lack of creditworthiness in previous
work.

Ideally, one would prefer to introduce also a measure of "non

compressible" imports, where the terin defines imports that a country
would find very difficult to reduce in a debt crisis situation, because
of special importance in production and consu,mption (e.g. oil, basic
foodstuffs, primary inputs etc.)

Lack of satisfactorily coneistent

data precluded the construction of such measures.
The :ratio of debt service due over exports is considered.a further
creditworthiness indicator since it describes the ability of an economy
to finance its yearly interest and principal obligations that are a
pressing concern for the short run.

Attempts to break up interest from

principal repayments are undertaken in order to shed some light on the
on-going controversy over the "liquidity vs. solvency" question.

If

markets function well in the sense of never refusing access to a
basically solvent borrower, the lenders should attach higher
significance to receiving promptly interest payments from a country.
The ratio of reserves to imports should be a measure of how long
an economy would be able to finance its imports by using its stock of
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reserves without seeking refuge in higher levels of external borrowing.
This ratio may both indicate high creditworthiness and low demand for
new loans, ceteris paribus, since existing stocks of reserves can be
used to do such financing.
Real GNP per capita captures aid motivations in the supply of new
lending, as well as the degree of financial well-being of a country
that might signify high creditworthiness.
growth rate of real income.

The same applies to the

Note that one could potentially try direct

measures of flows of aid-funds to particular economies, in case such
measures were available.

A high exports/GDP ratio may be a

characteristic viewed as undesirable by international bankers, because
an open economy is more vulnerable to pric~ shocks in the commodities
markets and to falling demand.for its exported goods following a
recession in the industrialized world.

On

the other hand, the planners

of a country with a highly open economy are more likely to be
disciplined in their international financial dealings and less likely
to repudiate, recognizing that their country stands to lose greatly
from a drying-up of sources of international credit.
Past repayments problems reflected in the form of IMF
arrangements, reschedulings and/or significant arrears outstanding
could be strong indications of a lack of creditworthiness if learning
processes are important on the part of the bankers.

Various

alternatives were tried that counted all past problems from the
starting year of observation.

The results indicate that the bankers

have "short memories" - most of the negative impact is captured by any
repayments problem(s) occuring in the immediately preceding period.
To go on to factors that should mainly affect the demand for new
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loans, we first mention the debt service obligati ons that are due,
includin g any accumul ated arrears.

The next factor is the level of

imports that induces a demand for foreign exchange to finance them.
The real income generate d in an economy and the rate with which it is
growing should clearly appear in the optimiza tion problem the planners
are solving, as should the terms of trade the country faces.

We do not

try the latter since they did not appear importan t enough in [23].
High debt obligati ons could be expected to raise demand for new loans
in order to help meet these obligati ons.

The existing reserves of

foreign exchange are an alternat ive source of financin g current account
deficits , hence they should affect negative ly the demand for new
foreign loans •. A quickly expandin g economy might impose high
requirem ents on external borrowin g in order to finance such a fast pace
of expansio n.

On the other hand high levels of real per capita income

might characte rize a well managed, affluent economy less likely to be
in need of amassing huge externa l debts.

With these conside rations in

mind, the most general formula tions we try for the (notiona l) Demand
6
and Supply function s, and for the Limit on arrears for Model C, are:

(III.1)

DEMAND=d1+d2*(Debt service due/Exp orts)
+d3*(Re serves/Im ports)+d 4*(Real GNP per capita)
+d5*(Growth rate of real GNP)
+d6*(Imports/GDP)+d7*POST73

(III.2)

SUPPLY=s1+s2*(Total debt outstand ing/Exp orts)
+s3*(In terest due/Exp orts)+s4 *(Princi pal due/Exp orts)
+s5*(Re serves/Im ports)+s 6*(Real GNP per capita)
+s?*(Growth rate of real GNP)
+s8*(Exports/GDP)+s9*QRSSIMFL+s10*QARRL+s11*POST73
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(III.;)

ARREARS_LIMIT=a1+a2*(Total debt outstandin g/Exports )
+a3*(Debt service due/Expor ts)
+a4*(Real GNP per capita)
+a5*(Growth rate of real GNP)
+a6*(Exports/GDP)+a7*QRSSIMFL+a8*POST73

where

QRSSIMFL= Dummy taking the value 1 whenever reschedul ing requested
and/or IMF agreen1ent in effect in the preceding period
QARRL

= Dummy taking the value 1 whenever QRSSIMFL equals 1 and non

zero arrears on principal and/or on interest existed in
preceding period
POST73

= Du,mmy taking the value 1 after 1973
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Part IV
Empirical Findings

We begin with Table 1 that presents estimates of the three-regime
model obtained under i.i.d. assumptions.

We find the demand for debt

to increase strongly in the debt service to exports ratio, possibly
signifying a desire for new debt to keep financing accumulated
obligations.

Demand is also found to rise with the imports to GDP

ratio, presUlllably because this ratio implies a high need for foreign
exchange financing.

The significantly negative coefficient of per

capita income seems to imply that relatively affluent countries have a
lower need for external debt.

This finding agrees with results in·

[23] where it was found that the behaviour of lower to middle income
countries was markedly different from the one of well-off nations.
}Toceeding to supply factors, we find that history of repayments
problems has a strongly depressing effect on the availability of new
loans, especially so if the previous period was one with non.,.z.ero
significant arrears.

The stock of debt to exports ratio appears with a

significantly positive coefficient (though of a very small magnitude)
suggesting that bankers keep supplying funds to countries with which
they have a history of commitment.

Though statistically not

significant, a high reserves to import ratio that is supposed to
indicate a creditworthy economy comes out positive.

The debt service

components (interest due over exports and principal due over exports)
turn out positive but insignificant.

The positive signs once again

suggest that bankers may be influenced by past commitment
considerations.

However the fact that the principal due coefficient is

found to be significantly smaller than one suggests that liquidity
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problems are likely since the bankers seem to refuse to roll over
principal obligations one for one.
Moving to the determinants of the arrears limit, debt service once
again is found to have a significantly positive effect.

This suggests

that bankers may monitor arrears as a percentage of debt obligations
(the stock of debt is also found to have a positive while insignificant
effect).

As expected, past repayments problems tighten the arrears

limit significantly.

Exports to GDP come in with a negative (but

statistically insignificant) sign both on the supply side and on the
arrears limit, which may mean that bankers view a high exports ratio as
a "bad" thing - high degree of openness implying that the economy in
question is too vulnerable to the vagaries of commodities....ma rkets shocks
and to the policies of the industrialized world.

We find a

significantly positive correlation (0.28) between demand and supply
unobservables, with most of the shocks coming from the demand side
( <i) =1-28 versus a8=0.47) •
'ro examine the robustness of the specification of the 3-regime

Model C, we now consider related "limited information" models, that only
investigate the incidence of crises.

Qualitatively, one may think of

the set-up as one with three relevant "choices":
1: no debt-repayments problem, 2: significant arrears, but no real
"crisis", and 3: debt crisis.
A natural way of modelling this is through a simple trinomial
logit model (see [21]).

In the absence of lagged dependent variables

the conditional MLE approach of [1] and [5] would have been applicable.
Here we will proceed with preliminary estimations that
pool together the data, neglecting their panel nature (a possibly
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misleading procedure given the random-effects results of [14]).
trinomial logit estimates are presented in Table 2.

Such

The suffix (2 or

3) signifies the alternative-spe cific dummy variable with which the

independent variable in question was interacted to achieve
Model MNLII differs from MNL1 in allowing for lagged
choice variables (denoted by REGiLAGj ). Two variables, IMFHIST.J. and

identification.

count the cumulated number of previous years in which a debtRSSHIST.,
J.
repayments problem occured:

years in which IMF conditionality- related

programs were in .effect and years of requesting/sign ing reschedulings
of debt-obligation s respectively.

In using these variables we attempt

to examine, within the limitations of the

MNL approach, how "long"

memories for past debt problems the bankers have.

We generally find

that the incidence of most recent problems (REGiLAGj) is more important
than the cumulated number of problems in the more distant past.

The

lagged "choice" of regime again exhibits extremely high explanatory
power.

Given its "limited information" nature, the trinomial logit

model does not afford separate identification of D and S parameters.
We next proceed with a nested trinomial logit model (see [22]) of
the following structure:.

Regime I
no problem

Regime II
significant arrears,
no real crisis
FIGURE 1

Regime III
debt crisis
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This model is tried because "choices" 2 and 3 are both debt
repayments problem cases (albeit of different severity).

Hence one

might expect higher substitutability between these two, a possibility
the standard MNL cannot allow for.
appear in Table 3.

The estimates for the nested model

"THETA" is the dissimilarity parameter associated

with node N (see [22]).

Application of classical tests presented in

[17], indicate that the plain MNL model is not rejected against the
Nested model.7
We now summarize our findings with the basic two-regime (excess
demand, excess supply) models, with- (Model B) and without- (Model A)
classifications on regimes.

(The detailed estimates can be obtained

from the author upon request.)

Model B employed the classification of

regimes whereby constrained periods were taken to be ones that involved
requests for reschedulings, IMF agreements and involvement, and/or
significant arrears on either interest or principal obligations.
("Significant" is defined as higher than 1 percent of total debt for
principal and 0.1 percent for interest).

This classification

essentially lumped together the "moderate excess demand" and "crisis"
regimes into a single supply-constrained regime.

We found no dramatic

changes in the signs of the significant coefficients.
An

interesting finding was that now the principal due to exports

ratio on the supply side became strongly significant (asymptotic t
statistic higher than 7), still with magnitude less than 1.

The

smaller than 1 coefficient again suggested that liquidity pressures may
build up on countries with high external indebtedness, since the
bankers seem unwilling to roll-over principal obligations fully.
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Model A employed the method that does not use classificati ons on
regimes, but simultaneou sly tries to estimate the regime classificati on
most consistent with the data.

These results were not very close to

the ones that employed the classificati on rule above, suggesting that
this classificati on might be inaccurate.

This statement can be

formally examined through the use of Hausman tests as explained in [13].
Another interesting finding was that in both two-regime models the
shocks seemed to be coming more from the supply rather than the demand
side (a8=0.39, aD=0.28).

This may suggest that the 3-regime

modelling is a sensible way of refining the supply side into supply of
new loans and monitoring of arrears.
We also tested the "petrodolla rs" hypothesis using the 3-regime
model.

The POST73 dummy was found statisticall y insignifica nt on all

three sides. 8
interesting :

The signs of the coefficient s, however, were
both the supply of new loans and the arrears limit were

found to have risen from 1974 onwards relative to their pre-1974
values, a finding that broadly agrees with the claim that the oil-shock
created a glut of petrodollar s in the internation al capital markets.
(Of course, this should be weighed against the implied shortage of OECD
funds that resulted from the oil shock).

The effect on the demand was

(insignifica ntly) negative which is against the usual view that the
developing countries attempted to maintain their declining standards of
living after the oil-shock by obtaining higher external debts.

I
I:
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We finally present results in Table 4 employing the main
econometric innovation of this paper, namely introducing, (random)
country heterogeneity into the three regime model. 9

The country

specific unobservables appear important, with the demand side country
effect having a standard deviation cr equal to 0.369 with asymptotic
T}

t=?-53, and the supply side effect

e with

0

=.107 (t=6.4;).

8

In

general, changes in the t-statistics due to the random effects
estimation are of the order of 10-25 percent.
of stronger demand-side heterogeneity its t-statistic from
effects.

s.90

°n

There is some evidence

falls from 1.28 to 0.94 and

to 2.;s after the introduction of the random

The past repayments problems dummies remain significant,

though they lose some of their explanatory power.

This suggests that

the reason we were finding past history to be an important factor under
i.i.d. assumptions was not because of neglecting country
heterogeneity.
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Part V
Ex Post Predictions-of Debt Repayments Crises Using the 3-Regime Model

We now present within-sample "predictions" from our 3-regime model
with two aims in mind:

First, such "predictions" can act as an

illuminating check on the specification of the model.

Second, an idea

can be obtained as to how important the neglect of unobservable
heterogeneity can be for our problem.
The following graphs show probabilities of debt repayments
"crises" (Regime '3) for a selected subsample of countries (Latin
.American ones with fairly widely known debt histories).

P3 uses the

point coefficient estimates of Table 1 that neglect country
heterogeneity.

In Figure (a) ·of each graph, P3Z, P3DP, and P3SP all

employ the Random Effects estimates of Table 4 and are probabilities
conditional on particular values of.the random effects.

P3Z assumes

that both demand and supply effects are at their (unconditional) means
of zero.

P3DP follows the scenario unfavourable to a country in which

its unobserved demand effect is equal to one (estimated) standard
deviation above its zero mean, ·while the supply effect is below the
mean by one standard deviation.

P3SP pictures the converse situation

of demand being uncharacteristi cally low by one standard deviation of
its random effect, while supply being up by one standard deviation.

In Figures (b), P3 is plotted alongside upper (UB) and lower (LB)
asymptotic confidence bounds of one estimated (asymptotic) standard
deviation ~

3

, calculated through the usual Taylor-series asymptotic

expansion:
~
Avar(~).

l.
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The first general conclusi on we draw is that the problem of
implaus ibly high crises probabi lities uniform ly predicte d by various
"reduced -form" models in [23] seems to be overcome by the 3-regime
model of this paper.
Secondly , we point out that heterog eneity-e ffects appear importan t
to the extent that fairly probable values of such effects are seen in
some cases to double or halve the crisis-p robabil ities.

Moreover, the

range from P3DP to P3SP is of the same order of magnitud e and generall y
wider than the range between the asympto tic confiden ce bounds presente d

in Figure (b) of each graph.
Thirdly, the probabi lities presente d below appear to track fairly
well events in country -histori es that one would expect to -affect
signific antly the external -indebte dness situatio n of a country.
lt is interest ing that·the debt problems of Bra~il appear wholly
oil-shoc k related:

the probabi lities underwent a distinct jump after

1974 and never receded to their pre-oil shock levels. See Figure (2).
The tracking o'f actual events exhibite d by the figures for Chile
is quite impress ive.

The politica l and economic upheava ls of the 1971-

1975 years are captured by steeply rising crisis probabi lities, calming
down after the decent performa nce of the economy in the followin g 3
years.

A drastic and apparen tly ill-time d liberali zation policy, as

well as a major collapse in the price of copper in 1978-197 9, the
single most importan t export good of Chile, appears to have renewed the
pressure s on the economy.
The predicti ons for Costa Rica (Figure (4)) agree very well with
the events of 1979-198 1, which culminat ed with a major reschedu ling
signed in 1982.

An

interest ing point is that the Costa Rican
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authorities were trying without success for 2 years beginning 1980 to
convince their internation al lenders that the economy was in a crisis
and in need of a reschedulin g.

It is reassuring that the model starts

predicting rising crisis probabilitie s from 1979.
The Jamaican experience has been one of almost continual and
recently mounting external debt problems (see Figure (5)).
calm followed the IMF arrangement s signed for 1973 and 1974.

Relative
1977

marks the beginning of a dramatic upward trend in crisis probabilitie s,
reflecting well the subsequent signing of all types of IMF
conditional ity-related agreements, culmin,ating in a major rescheduling
of the debt obligations signed in 1981.

In 1977, the Mexican authorities took a very explicit policy
decision of pursuing Vigorous economic growth.

Our model seems to tell

us that the policy was beyond the means of the economy, especially in

view of the slackening of the oil-market in the subsequent years, thus
leading to the ensuing debt repayments problems.
Finally, Venezuela (Figure (7)) is seen to have been extremely
creditworth y (by the standards of the other 5 economies considered)
throughout the period under study, which may partially reflect the fact
that this country is a major oil exporter.
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Part VI
Conclusions
This paper presented and estimated models of lending in
internation al capital markets with the allocation of credit being
primarily carried out along quantity-rat ioning lines at basically
(statistica lly) exogenous interest rate cost.

New sources of

information about the possibility and extent of credit constraints were
explored.

The main findings confi,rm the previously documented

i.lllportance of creditworth iness indicators on the supply of funds and on
limits on "acceptable " levels of arrears.

We also find that a history

of debt repayments problems has a strongly dampening effect on the
availabilit y of new funds and a tightening of limits on arrears.
Moreover the evidence suggests that high levels of debt obligations
fQrce bankers to maintain a flow of funds to such customers.
Demand factors identified here include:

the use of existing

foreign exchange reserves as an alternative to external debt, high
imports levels inducing high demand for foreign debts to finance them,
and a lower demand by relatively affluent borrowers, other things being
equal.

The stochastic shocks were seen to arise primarily from the

demand side.

This finding is reversed in the two-regime models which

do not distinguish supply of pure loans from allowing arrears to rise.
High debt obligations are accompanied by high demand for new funds,
possibly to keep meeting these existing obligations .
Substantial differences in results were observed in the two-regime
models, when classifying as credit constrained an economy that asks to
reschedule its debt obligations , requests/acc epts an IMF involvement or
has its obligations go into arrears.

This might suggest that such a
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classifying rule is misleading, or that neglecting classifying
information can lead to very inaccurate estimates.

We find some

evidence for the claimed glut of "petrodollars" after the 1973 oil
shock leading to higher levels of international lending.

Supporting

evidence for liquidity problems inducing external debt crises even for
overall solvent borrowers is found.

The claimed exogeneity of the

interest rate costs needs to be analyzed further.
Explicit allowance for the possibility of country heterogeneity
establishes a strong role for country-specific persistent unobservable
effects, without eliminating the importance of a history of past
repayments problems.
Within-sample "predictions" of probabilities of debt crises
implied by our estimated models were used for testing the specification
of the models.

Analogous predictions under alternative scenarios on

the LDC's external debt situation can serve to examine the effects of
such·alternative scenarios.

It should further be noted that a more

powerful test of our specification would have been a set of out-of
sample predictions.

We plan to attempt this further test of the model,

as more data gradually becomes available.
The use of classification information in disequilibrium models
merits further examination.

The question whether it might ever be

desirable in finite samples to employ even imperfect such information
should be addressed.

The issues of duration of debt repayments crises

also seem to warrant future study, as does the role of economic
conditions in the developed countries in affecting probabilities of
debt problems in the developing nations.

I
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Appendix
The Likelihood Function for the 3-Regime Model
with D and S Country-Specific Random Effects

We modify the 3-regime model in [23] and [15] to incorporate
heterogeneity, and the likelihood function is derived under "random
effects" assumptions on the demand and supply of new loans. 10

Note

that fixed year effects can be handled as an extra set of 2T
parameters, estimated along with the structural parameters of the
model.

(The 1.1.d. case is presented in Appendix B of [23]).

Stochastic elements enter our model at three points. Both the
S
D
notional demand N curve and the maximal supply N are linear functions
of predetermined variables with additive random shocks for each country
and period.
+T) +ed
ND-D
it
i
it- it
N:t= sit+ 8i + e~t
Joint normality assumptions are made, with the vector (e:t,e~t) being
for all i
mutually independently distributed from the vector (n.,8.),
].
].
and t.

We will use the natural notation for the variances of the four

errors. 11

Also let p=corr(ed,es) and pT'l 8=corr(n,8).
We next characterize the stochastic nature of the arrears limit L*

by an exponential random variable with cdf:
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Prob(L* < l) = 1 - exp(-Bl-C),
where Band Care linear functions of predetermined variables.

The

nonnegativity property of the exponential provides a natural
characterization of a lower limit on a financial stock like arrears. 12
Given that L* is imposed by suppliers, Band C contain basically the
same country characteristics that enter the overall credit limit.
Define the latent variables A*(= ND - NS) and L*.

Further

define the observables to be the realized level of new lending (N), the
realized level of arrears (A), and a discrete variable indicating the
event of a rescheduling (6).

The three possible regimes can now be

· · formally characterized:_

Regime 1:
A*

< 0 <=>

excess supply

D
N=N, A=O, o=O.

Regime 2: moderate excess demand
0

s A=A*, 6=0.
< A* < L* <=> N=N,
Regime 3:

A*

large excess demand

> L* <=> 6=1 •

The likelihood function for this problem is obtained as follows:
Consider a country i and evaluate probabilities conditional on the
specific random effects of this country.

Manipulating the joint normal

distributions yields the conditional distributions:

~ N((D-S+11

~-po-Do-S

D

2

2

-&+,-----(N -(D+11))), a ( 1-p ) )
~

D

s
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(N 5 IA*, TJ, e)

(A.5.2)

~

N((S+0 ►

paDas~as

(A*+S-D+8-TJ)), asa~

~ N((D+TJ,s+e),

(Nn,~I TJ, e)

(A.5.4)

(A*ITJ,8) ~ N((D+T)- S-8),i)

(1-p 2 )

O'

O'

(A.5.3)

2

2

2

[ "ii

pasD'as] )
a:

We are now in a position to calculate the likelihood for each
regime.
D

Regime 1 (A=0,6=0, N=N)
(A.6.1) h1 = P(A=O,o=O,N=NDITJ,8) =
P(A

* < OIND=N,TJ,8)

P(ND=NITJ,8)=

as

9-ry+S-D-(N-D-TJ) ( 1-p - )

. .·.
a ✓ 1-p2

lb(

~ ).J._ <P(

.

°n

5

N-D-TJ )
aD

5

(A-6-2) h2 = P(A>0,6=0,N=N ITJ,8)=

s
P(N =NIA,TJ,8) P(L* > AIA,TJ,8) P(AITJ,8)=
2

cs

po: a -a
D ~ S (A+S-D+( 8-TJ))

a __
aSaD ✓ 1-p2/ a

)e-BA-C l, $(A-D+S-!] +8)

a

a

Regime 3 ( 6=1 )
(A.6.3) ~=P(6=1) =P(L*

< A*)=J;P(L * < A*IA*,

TJ,8) P(A*ITJ,8) dA*

- A4 ...tD-S+T)-8
='2',-------)
O'

D-S+T}-8
«-----Ba).
O'

2 2
exp(-B(D-S+T}-8)-C+O.
5B er )
.

The joint likelihood of the T. observations on country i, conditional
l.
on the specific effects ni and ei is:
H(T1.,8.)=1Ih1(T1.,8.) Ilh2(n.,e.) 1Ih3(n.,8.)
"J.11

"J.12

113

l.1

and therefore the T.1 observations on country i have likelihood 13

f_..,.. ,. f_..,.. ,.

H( Tl."l. , 8.1 ) f(

Tl. , 8.
"l.
1

) d Tl."l. d 8.1 = 1 •
1

•

I

MLE is then obtained by maximizing

l

i=1

lnL .•
1

It is interesting to note that the structure of our specification
incorporates characteristics from all of the four usual classes of
limited dependent variables in Econometrics.

First, we have a probit-

like structure through the dummy classification variable

o;

second,

observed arrears A have clear ~-like characteristics; third,
transacted new flows of funds N have a switching regimes structure;
fourth, N and A both incorporate the feature of endogenously missing
~ , in that when regime 3 is observed, we do not attempt to identify
the levels of N and A.
An important issue to be addressed is how we handle the fact that

the regressors appearing in Part III include realizations of lagged
dependent variables.
discussed at length in

This creates the initial conditions problem

[19]

and

[14].

To briefly state the problem:

let~ be a latent variable and Yt its observed counterpart.

Since~

is stochastically dependent upon the random effect ei, so is Yt·
Therefore inconsistency will in general result if this dependence is
neglected by attempting to simply condition on y

0

•

In a nutshell,

- A5 -

the true likelihood contribution for country i takes the form:

(A.9)

f-""""

f(yT, • • • ,Y1 IY , 8) f(y I 8) f( 8) d8
0

0

and conditioning on y as an exogenous variable neglects the term
0

f(y

0

la)

and results in inconsistency.

The approach adopted here

amounts to using the same functional form (given by A.6.1-A.6.3) for
f(y 0 l8) as for f(yt1Yt_ 1 ,e), t>1, while letting the coefficients of the
regressors be different for the f(y le) term. 14 See [2] for analogues
0

of this approach in the simpler case of the linear regression model.
An. issue that warrants further investigation is the precise form of the

f(y 0 le) term, which is a non-trivial problem given the non-linearities
of our models.

The approach suggested by [19] and adopted here, that

assumes the same functional form for the reduced form of a dependent
variable as the structural equation of this variable is only an
approxiinate solution.

We tentatively adopt this approximate technique

in this paper, while planning extensive analysis of the issue.

TABLE 1
MODEL C
Dependent variables are DVDEL, DNEW & ARR*
(Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses)
Variable
(lagged one year)

New Loan
Demand

New Loan
Supply

Limit
on Arrears

Constant

-0-3470
[ 3.223]
6.5243
[25-267]
-0. 3911
[ 5.261]
0.0963
[ 0.120]
0.9499
[ 4-885]

0.4376
[6.988]

[ o. 571 ]

Debt Service Due/Exports
Real GNP/Capita
Growth rate of Real GNP
Imports/GDP
Reserves/Import s
Exports/GDP
Debt/Exports
Indicator for IMF support
or rescheduling
Indicator for arrears
Interest due/Exports
Principal due/Exports
Standard· Deviation
Correlation
Likelihood Value

*DVDEL=1

1.2759
[ 8-897]
0.2788
[ 4-785]

0.0203
[0.493]
0.0597
[0.167]
0.0771
[ 0.890]
-0.0413
[ 0.369]
0.0875
[ 2-640]
-0. 1451
[ 1.932]
-0-3058
[ 6.480]
0.4552
[ o. 505]
0.2146
[ 1. 126]
0.4679
[20. 284]

-1668-386

if either a rescheduling is requested
and/or an IMF agreement is in effect.
DNEW =total new debt obtained within the period
(scaled by the flow of exports).
ARR =total significant Principal and Interest
outstanding arrears on debt obligations.

0.2195
1. 844~
[ 2.394J
-0.0814
[ 0.383]
0.0785
[ o. 041]

-0-3060
[ 0.332]
0.1563
[ 1- 169]
-1.3303
[ 6.082]

Table 2
Trinomial Logi t Estimates of Model C
MNL II

MNL I

VARIABLE ESTIMATE STD-ERR

T-STAT

ESTIMATE STD-ERR

T-STAT

DEBTX3
DEBTX2

o.6473
0.4418

0.187
0.158

3.471
2.793

0.4193
0.2615

0.202
0.183

2.080
1.432

DRGNP3
DRGNP2

-5.2060
0.3020

2.507
1.407

-2.077
0.215

-2.5357
3. 0199

2.750
1. 793

-0.922
1.685

DSDEXP3
DSDEXP2

3.1 so1
2.1089

0.983
0.853

3.235
2.472

2.7538
0.9059

1.067
1.019

2.582
0.889

EXPGDP3
EXPGDP2

1-3786
0.5095

1.943
0.949

0.709
0.537

-0.0489
-0.0981

2.125
1. 243

-0.023
-0.079

IMFHIST3
IMFHIST2

0.2889
-0.5246

0.081
0.097

3.572
-5-398

0.0598
-0.4722

0.099
0.125

0.606
-3-786

IMPGDP3
IMPGDP2

-1.4993
-0.0118

1.641
0.815

-0.914
-0.015

-0.3283
0.2433

1.782
1.067

-0.184
0.228

RESIMP3
RESIMP2

-5-9428
-1.3097

1.022
0.362

-5-814
-3.615

-5.6083
-1.2879

1.057
0.462

-5-304
-2.786

RGNPPC3
RGNPPC2

:.0.5086
-0.6525

0.252
0.146

-2.020
-4-454

-0.4259
-0.4497

0.261
0.184

-1.629
-2.442

RSSHIST3
RSSHIST2

-0.1982
-0.1148

0.184
0.188

-1.078
-0.611

-0.1400
-0.0002

0.207
0.225

-0.677
-0.001

REG2LAG3
REG2LAG2

1. 6021
3.4115

0.356
0.237,

4.496
14.400

REG3LAG3
REG3LAG2

2.472s
1. 9957

0.376
0.389

6.585
5.125

-1.3529
-1.3326

0.514
0.332

-2.630
-4.016

DUMMY3
DUMMY2

-0.7589
0.1269

LOGLIKELIHOOD
LOGLIKELIHOOD AT ZERO

0.460
0.250

-1.649
0.508
-683-4544
-903.0593

-516.7693
-903.0593

Table 3

Nested Trinomial Logit Estimates of Model C

NMLN I

VARIABLE

NMLN II

ESTIMATE STD-ERR

T-STAT

ESTIMATE STD-ERR

T-STAT

DEBTX3
DEBTX2

o.6804
0.4312

0.211
0.162

3.21s
2.658

o. 3691
0.2733

0.194
0.177

1.907
1. 546

DRGNP3
DRGNP2

-5-9075
0.4953

3.192
1.483

-1.851
0.327

-1.4367
2.6196

2.707
1.817

-0.531
1.442

PSDEXP3
DSDEXP2

3.3363
2.1022

1.099
0.870

3.035
2.416

2.3619
1. 0515

1.107
0.992

2.134
1.060

EXPGDP3
EXPGDP2

1. 5530
0.5024

2.230
0.958

0.696
0.524

-0.0805
-0.1142

1. 673
1.207

-0.048
-0.095

IMFHIST3
IMFHIST2

0.3539
-0.5743

0.169
0.149

2.09s
..3.862

-0.0128
-0-3896

0.130
0.156

-0,.098
~2-494

IMPGDP3
IMPGDP2

-1.7586
-0.0207

1.947
0.823

-0~903
-0.025

-0.1570
0.3084

1.432
1.044

-0.110
0.295

RESIMP3
RESIMP2

-6.7274
-1.2297

2.140
0.408

-3.144
-3.012

-4.2955
-1.4664

1.768
0.500

-2.429
-2.933

RGNPPC3
RGNPPC2

-0.5024
-0.6538

o.2s2
0.149

-1.783
.-4-374

-0.4472
-0.4455

0.216
0.175

-2.066
-2.547

RSSHIST3
RSSHIST2

-0.2107
-0.1214

0.195
0.198

-1.078
-0.614

-0.1120
-0.0052

0.196
0.204

-0.571
-0.025

REG2LAG3
REG2LAG2

2.0782
3.3250

o.663
0.254

3.136
13.114

REG3LAG3
REG3LAG2

2.3909
2.1726

0.351
0.400

6.807
5.439

DUMMY3
DUMMY2

-0.9326
0.0887

0.649
0.269

-1.437
0.330

-1. 1482

-1.2167

0.464
0.349

-2.473
-3-490

THETA

1.1852

0.430

2.754

0.6467

0.409

1.580

LOGLIKELIHOOD
LOGLIKELIHOOD AT ZERO

-683-3529
-903.0593

-516.4444

TABLE 4
PANEL ESTIMATES OF MODEL C
Dependent variabl.es are DVDEL, DNEW*
(Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses )
Variable
(lagged one year)

New Loan
Demand

Constant

-0.342
[ 2.051
5-650
[20.072]
-0.439
[ 5.405]
1.149
[ 6.205]

Debt Service Due/Exports

Real GNP/Capita
Imports/GDP
Reserves/Im ports
Debt/Export s
Indicator f'or IMF support
or rescheduling
Indicator for arrears
Interest due/Exports
Principal due/Exports
Standard Deviation
Correlation
Random Effects
Standard deviation

Likelihood Value

*DVDEL=1

0.944
[ 2.;75]
0.182
[ 3.828]

New Loan
Supply
0.460
[ 8.841]

0.116
[ 1.274]
0.0625
[ 1. 915]
-0.175
[ 2-358]
-0.261
[ 4-963]
0.436
[ 0-485]
0.0624
[ 0.310]
0.453
[20.975]

0.367
[ 7.52y]
-1607.892

if either a rescheduling is requested
and/or an IMF agreement is in effect.
DNEW =total new debt obtained within the period
(scaled by the flow of exports).

Limit
on Arrears
0.0356
[ 0.067]
1.9s3
[ 2.680]

0.146
[ 1. 225]
-1.375
[ 6.4;5]

0.111
[ 6.425]
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Footnotes

1we agree with [10] that "disequili brium" is a very laden and

actually misleadin g word to use in this context. What we more
accuratel y mean should better be called "Non Walrasian " equilibriu m prices failing to move not because they are-arbit rarily fixed, nor
because there are menu-type of adjustmen t costs in doing so, but
because it is not in the rational interest of the agents to actually
move them from their current values. See [11]. In the context of
credit markets, lenders might find it unprofita ble to raise the cost of
funds charged to their borrowers because the probabili ty that they
would default on their loans could go up. On the other hand by raising
the price in times of shortage of credit, the bankers would attract an
unprofita bly high share of "bad" risks (less creditwor thy borrowers )
who have a higher propensit y to default.
2The consequen ces of such misspecif ication are discussed in [14],
where it is shown that estimatio n technique s that work under the
assumptio n of Normality of the errors yield consisten t but inefficie nt
estimates for the coefficie nts, and wrong (inconsis tent) estilaates for
the standard errot'B. Further, methods that impose Logistic
distribut ional assumptio ns on the errors generally produce inconsist ent
coefficie nt estimates as well. In either case, the presence of lagged
dependent variable( s) would also cause inconsist ent coefficie nt
estimates . The important point is that, in such models, inference s
drawn under false i.i.d. assumptio ns may be seriously misleadin g.
3As it is well known ([ 18]), these effects introduce persisten ce
over time that may be practical ly indistingu ishable from state
dependence arising due to the past debt performan ce of a country being
important in affecting the bankers' assesinent of its creditltor thiness.
The two questions ha.ve distinct econo111-ic implicati ons: unobserve d by
the economet rician country heterogen eity needs to be modelled so as to
ensure correct inference s, while ideally one would like to be able to
distingui sh it from persisten ce arising from actual (and thus
observable 1 past performan ce. There is a long controver sy in the
econometr ic literatur e ·concernin g the possibili ty of distinguis hing the
two types of persisten ce over time.
4caution must be exercised in using informati on about regimes
classific ation, though. As shown in [20], the estimator that uses such
informatio n (OR) will in general fail to be consisten t in case the
regime classific ation employed is not exact. On the other hand, even
though the estimator (NOR) that does not employ such informati on would
be inefficie nt in case the informatio n is correct, its consisten cy does
not rest on the accuracy of the regime classific ation the analyst has.
[13] discusses these issues and shows how com~arisons between the OR
and NOR estimator s through Hausman tests ([16J) can be used to examine
the accuracy of such informati on.
5This 2-stage optimizat ion problem is analogous to Jorgenson 's
investmen t function model. Instead of solving the (very hard) multi
period optimizat ion problem, a partial-ad justment mechanism is
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postulated in the single-perio d version of the model. As a result, our
model suffers from at least the same well-known theoretical problems.
6All explanatory variables are lagged one year in order to
attenuate simultaneity issues. The details of the constructio n of
variables and description of data sources can be found in Appendix C of

[23].

7Specifically

Ho

MNLI

MNLII

H1

NMNLI

NMNLII

we obtained the following test results:
LM

o:-f87
0.792

LR

0.201
0.650

Wald

07186'
0°746

2
The 10 percent critical level for a x (1) variate is 2.706. One
should note that the dissimilari ty parameter is very poorly determined in
NMNL11 : not only we cannot reject the MNL value of 1 (t=0.864), but we are
also unable to reject the hypothesis of a THETA equal too.

8The Likelihood Ratio x2 statistic was equal to 2-1849 and the
Lagrange Multiplier x2 statistic equal to 2-2454.agai nst a critical
value x2 (;)=7.815 a:t 0.05 significanc e level, thus neither rejecting
the null eypotnesis that the three cofficients are insignifica ntly
different from zero.
lessen tractability problems, we make the assumption that the
random effects on the supply- and demand- sides are uncorrelate d. This
assumption would be violated in case part of·the observed country
heterogenei ty arises because o.f common factors on the D and S sides
that we fail to model explicitly.
9To

10It is well known that the analogue of the "fixed effects"
estimator that treats Tlj_ and 91 as fixed unknown parameters and

attempts to estimate them, is in general inconsisten t in the non-linear
case due to the "incidental parameters" problem ([24]). A conditional
MLE might suggest itself for the "fixed effects" case along the lines
of [1], which would sacrifice asymptotic efficiency but would, unlike
"random effects", still be appropriate in case there is non zero
correlation between the regressors and the random effects Tli and ai.
Unfortunate ly the non-lineari ty of the models due to the minimum
condition takes the likelihood contribution s, (despite the initial
assumption of normality), outside the linear exponential family which
is the prerequisite for conditional MLE estimators to exist. See [5].
11 The crucial assumption, noted in the previous footnote, of

independenc e of the regressors and the random effects is implicit here,
with f(n,8) not depending on the X's. A Lagrange multiplier test of
such assumptions in the context of disequilibri um models is presented
in [ 13].
12This exponential distribution al assumption, though offering the

additional advantage of tractability , creates a subtle problem pointed

- F3 out by Dan McFadden: As will be seen below, all parameter s in the 3regime model (with- or without- heterogen eity effects) are
economet rically identifie d. This identific ation, however, may be a
direct consequen ce of the assumptio n that while ed, es, n and 8 are
Normally distribut ed, L* is exponenti al. To investiga te the importanc e
of these issues we plan to modify the distribut ional assumptio n on L*
to one of Normality .
13Each evaluatio n of the likelihoo d requires I mumerical
integratio ns over two variables , which can be prohibitiv ely expensive .
Hence we applied a computati onally efficient quadratur e method that
significa ntly enhances the feasibili ty of Maximum Likelihood
.Estimatio n. The method is discussed in [4] and [12].
14For computati onal simplicit y, the method was implemented in
three steps: First, consisten t estimates of the parameter s O of the
reduced form equations of the dependent variables y 0 are obtained.
Second, these consisten t estimates are substitute d in the f(y 0 le)
expressio n in (A.9) and the Likelihoo d function is ntaximized over the
structura l parameter s, thus providing consisten t but inefficie nt
estimates . We finally take a single Newton-Raphson step from the
complete set of initial estimates using the first order condition s of
the full maximum likelihoo d problem. The resulting estimates 11ould
have the same asymptoti c distributi on as the full maximum likelihoo d
·ones, provided the assumptio n of same functiona l form for f(y 0 je) and
·
f(YtLY't-1 • 8), t:f:1 were correct.
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